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ASYLUM DENIED: 
THE VIGILANT INCIDENT 
Clyde R. Mann 
There arc three classes of people 
in the world. The first learn from 
their own ('xperi('nee-thes(' are 
wise; the second learn from the 
experience of others-these arc 
the happy; the third neither learn 
from their own experience nor the 
experience of others-these arc 
fools. 
The Earl of Chesterfield 1 
Introduction. The attempt by Simas 
lonovieh Kudirka, a Lithuanian crew-
man on the Sovietskaya Litva, to seck 
asylum in the United States via the U.S. 
Coast Guard culler Vigilant on 23 
November 1970 und his forcible return 
to the Soviet fishing ship huve been 
widely reported and discussed by the 
citillenry. The case has created such 
interest and controversy as to cause thc 
author to study the maller in detail. It 
is not the pnrpoSl.: of this artie!!', with 
tlw h('nefit IlI'rlllill(·d. hy till: dlll'ity of 
hindsight, to present a learned analysis 
of the legal principles involved nor to 
fix blame nor to critieillc the Coast 
Guard, the Department of State, or any 
member thereof. Rather, the purpose of 
this article is to attempt to exclude all 
who read it from the last class of people 
listed by Chesterfield and to place them 
squarely in the wise and happy classes 
of people who learn from their own 
experiences and the experiences of 
others. Hopefully, the readers will 
analyze the reported facts and events 
and make their own judgments con-
cerninl! fault and blame, if any, after 
carefully considering the many signifi-
cant aspects of the case. Command and 
control, the deeisionmaking process, 
international law and politics, principles 
of military leadership, and concern for 
humanity are but a few of the:;c aspects. 
Although no formal conelu:;ions as to 
fault or blame are ,Irawn by the author, 
some recommendations are proposed to 
serve as guidelines for a U.S. com-
mander who is confronted by a similar 
situation in the fu ture. 
The facts and events as reported 
herein are bascd upon a memorandum 
prcpared for the President of the United 
States,2 reports of official investigations 
by the U.S. Coast Guard3 and the 
Department of State,4 congressional 
hearings before a subcommittce of the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives and the 
subcommittee's report thereon,s and 
the author's personal interview of some 
of the participants and eyewitnesses.6 
Much of the material contained in the 
official investigation by the U.S. Coast 
Guard has been incorporated in this 
artiele in hoc verba in summarizing the 
events which occurred in the Vigilant, at 
the First Coast Guard District Head-
quarters in Boston, and at Coast Guard 
Headquarters in Washington. The ma-
terial so used remains unrebutted after 
independent investigation by the au-
thor. A chronology of events is 
con taincd in appcndix I. 
The Rendezvous, Conference, Over-
tures of Defection, and Search for 
Advice. An offshore meeting between 
representatives of the New Bedford, 
Mass. fishermen, the National Marine 
Fisheries Service of the Department of 
Commerce, and the Soviet fishing fleet 
operating off the New England coast 
was arranged through appropriate diplo-
matic and other official channels. The 
purpose of the meeting was to discuss 
the allegation of the New Bedford 
fishermcn that thc Soviet fishermcn 
were taking too lIlany yellowtail noun-
der and that thcreshould be some 
rcstriction of fishing for such spccies. 
The Soviet fishermen had denied any 
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overfishing •. Similar meetings with So-
viet fishing fleets had been hdd in 
rccent years off both lhe A tlantic and 
Pacific coasts. Tlw U.S. Coast Guard 
culler Vigilant (WMI~C-6J7) was dilly 
designatcd by thl: Commander, Fin;t 
Coast Guard District, Boston, Mass., to 
provide transportation for the U.S. 
delcgatiqn. The Vigilant is a medium 
endurance cutter, 2 LO feet in length, 
with a complement of 10 officers and 
61 crewmen. 
The U.S. delegation consisted of 
both civilian and Government officials. 
The fishermen were represented by Mr. 
Robert M. Brieze, president of the New 
Bedford Seafood Producers' Associa-
tion; Mr. John Burt, the port agent for 
the New Bedford Fishermen's Union; 
and Mr. R.W. Nickerson, the resident 
director for the Seafood Association of 
New Bedford. The Assistant Regional 
Director, National Marine Fisheries 
Service, Department of Commerce, Mr. 
William C. Gordon, represented the 
United States. The delegation was 
accompanied by an interpreter, Mr. 
Alexis Obolensky from the National 
Marine Fisheries Service, Department of 
Commerce. In addition, Lt. Leo More-
house from the Law Enforcement 
Division, Office of Operations, U.S. 
Coast Guard IIcmlqlHlrters ill Wushing-
ton, attended as an observer. 
The U.S. delcgation boarded the 
Vigilant at B a.m. on Monday, 2:~ 
November 1970. The ship got underway 
at 8:49 a.m. and at 10:30 a.m. came 
alongside and moored port side to the 
Soviet vessel Sovietskaya Litva which 
had anchored within the 3-mile limit, 
that is, within the territorial waters of 
the United States. The point of 
rendezvous was about 1 mile off 
\'vlartha's Vineyard, Mass. The Soviet-
skaya Litva is a factory ship, a lIlother 
ship, ilpproximately 500 feet in lenl-"(th, 
di~placing about 14,000 ton~, with a 
crcw of about 150 men and 35 women. 
The Soviets prepared a guard boom 
rigged from the Sovietskaya Litva, 
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constructed of wircs and secured to a 
net with an old truck tire at the bottom. 
This wire, net, and tire devicc, sus-
pended from the boom by a cable, was 
used to transfer personnel between the 
two ships. 
The U.S. dclegation, together with 
Comdr. Ralph W. Eustis, thc Com-
manding Officer of the Vigilant, 
boarded the Soviet vessel for the 
confcrcnce. They had a brief luncheon 
in the Soviet Fishing Fleet Com-
mander's cabin before proceeding to a 
conference room to begin talks. Aftcr 
holding discussions for an hour or more; 
the group from the Vigilant was given a 
tour of the Soviet ship and returned to 
the conference room for more food, 
cognac, and talk. The Soviet conferees 
included the commanders of Lithu-
anian, Zapryba, Kalivingrad, and Lat-
vian fishing fleets operating in the 
Atlantic Ocean off New England; the 
Chief Inspector for Safety of Naviga-
tion; the Chief Technologist; the Chief 
Master Catcher of the Zapryba Fleet; 
the Captain and till' First Mate of the 
Sovietskaya Litva. SOllle of the Soviets 
appeared to be politieal and military 
officials rather than usual crewmcmbers. 
No armament was visible on the Soviet 
ship. J\,lr. Bricze, the president of Ihe 
New Bedford Seafood Produccrs A.,.. 
sociation (a 1944 refugee from Latvia) 
speaks Latvian and was able to engage 
four Latvians on the Soviet ship in 
conversation. It appeared to the U.S. 
delegation that the talks were pro-
cecding in a relatively successful man-
ner. 
While the conferecs were taking care 
of the business at hand, some of the 
Vigilant and Sovietskaya Litva per-
sonnel were standing near the rails of 
the two ships laughing, talking, and 
exchanging cigarettcs and candy. Some 
Vigilant crewmembers jokingly sug-
gested to their opposites that th"y 
shoulll I'onw ahoard the 1"igilallt. The 
Soviet f:'hip personnel responded hy 
drawing thcir fingers across their necks. 
It if:' not clear whether these gestures 
were in jest or otherwisl'. Sonll! 
personnel from the Vigilant, officer and 
enlisted, visited the Soviet ship. Such 
personnel were permitted to view the 
ship's engineroom, medical facilities, 
mess deck, and movie theater. During 
one such visit, Ens. John F. Hughes 
from the Vigilant met a second mate 
from the Soviet ship who could 
understand some words of the English 
language. 
Meanwhile, the first of several 
overtures by a single crewman from tllll 
Soviet ship indicating a desire to defect 
or to seek asylum was observed. At 
approximately 11:00 a.m., Lt. (jg.) 
Douglas A. Lundberg, the Operations 
Officer of the Vigilant, was on the port 
wing of the bridge when he noticed a 
crewman from the Soviet ship observing 
him closely from an upper deck about B 
feet across from him on the Soviet ship. 
This man was dressed in dark pants, 
sport shirt, and coat and was about 5 
fect 6 inches tall, weighed about 140 
pounds, and appmlrl,d to he VI'ry 
Illu:;(:ular. The lIlan was later idl'nlifil:d 
as Simas lonovidl Kudirka. 
Kudirka maclc a commcnt whidl 
Lundbcrg thought suggested an intl'n-
tion to ddeet to the tlnitell Siall's. 
Kudirka aded as if he did not dl!sire 10 
be detected by any of his shipmates. He 
looked over each of his shoulders and 
said, "gestapo, gestapo"!7 Lieutenant 
Lundberg immediately notified the 
Executive Officer of the Vigilant, Lt. 
Comdr. Paul E. Pakos, of his Imcounter 
with Kudirka. Thc Commanding Officer 
of the Vigilant, Commander Eustis, was 
on board the Sovietskaya Litva at this 
time. Pakos assigned Lundberg to the 
forecastle and Lt. (jg.) Richard E. 
Burke, Jr., the Communications Officer, 
to the fantail of the Vigilant to watch 
for K udirka. Pakos went to the port 
wing of the bridf.!;e lIIlIl g;IW Kudirka. 
who slall'd in brokl'n Engli~h. "I will go 
wilh you" anq. later, "I will cheek." 
Kudirka then left, returned a I'mv 
minutes later, and stated, "Not too 
eold.,,8 Pakos concluded that Kuclirka 
was planning to jump into the water. By 
this time other members of the 
Vigiwnt's crcw had noticed Kudirka and 
his apparent unusual interest in the 
Vigilant. Boatswain's Mate Third Class 
Richard P. Maresca saw Kudirka acting 
suspiciously ncar the rail of the Soviet 
ship. Ensign Hughes saw Kudirka, and 
the lalter tried to communicate with 
him, but his words were not understood 
by Hughes. 
In vil:w of Kudirka's continued 
manifestations of interest in the Vigi-
wnt, Pakos concluded by 12 m. that 
Kudirka might attempt to defect to the 
United States at any moment. He 
decided to tell only the Vigilant's 
officers of Kudirka's possible defection. 
He instructed them not to encourage 
Kudirka and made sure that one of the 
ship's officers was always on the bridge 
in case Kudirka decided to communi-
cate further with them. Lundberg was 
positioned on the port wing of the 
bridge. Pakos went below decks to draft 
a message to the First Coast Guard 
District in Boston. He decided to release 
the message and to attempt to get 
Commander Eustis back on board. The 
message was transmitted from the 
Vigilant at 12:43 p.m. (date time group 
231743Z because the Vigilant was in 
time zone plus 5, therefore, all message 
communications traffic identified in 
Zulu time is 5 hours in advance of 
eastern standard time), the text of 
which follows: 
A. MY 231558Z NOV 70 
1. SITUATION: ALONGSIDE 
SOVIET MOTHER SHIP AS PER 
REF A. ESTIMATE 80 PER-
CENT PROBABILITY THAT 
ONE CREWl\>IAN FROM SOVIET 
MOTHER SHIP WILL ATTEMPT 
DEFECTION TO VIGILANT. 
DEFECTION WAS NOT EN-
TICED. CREWMAN SPOKE IN 
BROKEN ENGLISH TO 
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OPERATIONS OFFICER THAT 
II1~ WISHED ASYLUM. SAME 
MAN LATER INDICATED TO 
EXEC OFF THAT WATER NOT 
TOO COLD AND THAT HE 
WO ULD SWIM. CO AND OTHER 
VISITORS STILL ABOARD 
AND UNAWARE OF 
SITUATION. WILL ATTEMPT 
TO ADVISE CO. 
2. IF ESCAPE IS UNDETECTED 
PLAN TO RECALL ENTIRE 
DELEGATION ONDER FALSE 
PHETENSE AND DI~PAHT. IF 
ESCAPE DETECTED FORESEE 
MAJOR PROBLEMS IF DELE-
GATION STILL ABOARD. REQ. 
ADVICE. 
3. PLAN NO ACTION PENDING 
FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS.9 
This message arrived at the headquarters 
of the Commander, First Coast Guard 
District at 12:49 p.m. Capt. Fletcher W. 
Brown, Jr., usually the Chief of Staff, 
was Acting District Commander. He had 
been so acting since· 3 November 1970 
when Rear Adm. William B. Ellis, the 
regular District Commander had gone 
on sick leave. When the message from 
the Vigilant was received, Captain 
Brown was out of the headquarters 
having lunch. lIe returned to his office 
at 1:07 p.m. at which time his secretary 
informed him of the Vigiwnt's message. 
He went to the Communications Center, 
read the message, and directed that it be 
sent to the Commandant of the Coast 
Guard. The message was received at 
Coast Guard Headquarters at 1:28 p.m. 
As Captain Brown was leaving the 
Communications Center, he saw Comdr. 
Jerome V. Flanagan, the District Legal 
Officer, showed him the message, and 
asked for his advice. Flanagan stated 
that should the man defect, he should 
be turned over to the State Department 
or Immigration Service. 
Captain Brown returned to his office 
at or about 1:18 p.m. and telephoned 
Rear Adm. Robert E. Hammond, Chief, 
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OfficI! of Operations, at Coast Guard 
Headquarters in Washington. Brown 
indicated that he desired help on a 
problem, told Hammond ahout the 
message from the Vigilant and that it 
had bi!en readdressed to Coast Gu'ard 
Headquarters and that the ships were 
about a mile from Martha's Vineyard 
within territorial waters. They diseussed 
the issues raised by the Vigilant's 
message as they saw them and both 
concluded that the main issue was how 
forcefully the personnel of the Vigilant 
eould eompete with the personnel of 
the Sovietskaya Litva in retrieving the 
defeetor in the event he jumped into the 
water. They did not diseuss possihle 
courses of action to be taken in the 
event the person seeking asylum or 
defection actually came into Coast 
Guard hands by jumping from the 
Soviet ship to the Vigilant or otherwise. 
Hammond indicated he would seck 
guidance from the Department of State. 
At the eompletion of this telephone 
conversation, Hammond summoned 
Capt. Wallace C. Dahlgren, Chief, 
Intelligence Divisioll at Coast Guard 
Headquarters, and briefed him Oil the 
conversation with Brown and the 
Vigilant's message. Dahlgren was di-
reeted to contact the State DepartuH!lIt 
for guidanee on the problem of gelling 
the defector out of the water. He was 
not asked to inquire as to U.S. policy 
with respect to defectors or persons 
seeking asylum. When the Vigilant 
message arrived at 1 :28 p.m. Hammond 
took a copy thereof to thc office of the 
Commandant of the Coast Guard and 
discussed thc mcssage and action being 
takcn with respect thereto with Viee 
Adm. Thomas It. Sargent 1fI, Assistant 
Commandant of the Coast Guard. He 
then returned to his office. He did not 
eon tact thc office of the Chief Counsel 
for advice. 
Captuin Dahlp:ren returned to his 
offiee, ufter having rl'eeived instructions 
from ({('ar Admiral Hammond, ut ahout 
J :30 p.m. and placed u telephone call to 
the Coast Guard Liaison Officer at the 
State DepartmenL Shortly thereafter 
the Vigilant's message was sent to the 
State Department. After some delay and 
several rereferrals, Dahlgren was, at 2:45 
p.m., able to telephonically communi-
cate with Mr. Edward K. Killham, 
Officer in Charge, Bilateral Political 
Affairs, Office of Soviet Union A ffuirs, 
Department of 8tute, who considered 
himself to be the proper person to give 
advice on the maUer. Dahlgmn in-
formed Killham that it applmreo a 
seaman from a Soviet ship would 
attempt to defect to a Coast Guard 
eutler, that the Vigilant's message had 
been sent to the State Department, and 
requested guidance. Mr. Killham st,ltecl 
that he would wait until he studied the 
message before he could comment on 
the situation. The message was received 
by him at 3 p.m. and at 3: 15 p.m. he 
telcphoned Dahlgren. Both of these 
gentlemen recall that thc main topic of 
the conversation was the amount of 
force which could properly be used by 
Coast Guard per!'onnd in ('omp(·tin~ 
with perRonncl of tIll: Sovil:t ship in 
attempting to retrieve a man from tllll 
Soviet ship from the sea. Mr. Killham 
advised that the Coast Guard could 
exer('i~(: its traditional responHihilily of 
search and resclle if the man waH in the 
water. 10 It docs not appear that 
Killham had been informed or was 
otherwise aware of the fact that the 
Vigilant and the Sovietskaya Litva were 
within the territorial waters of the 
United States. Neither Killham nor 
Dahlgrcn discussed the possible ways, 
other than being retrieved from the 
water, in which the def('dor ('ould 
arrive aboard the Coast Guard ship. 
Killham saw three issues raised by the 
facts known to him: The possibility that 
the dcfeetion was not ~t:nuiaw mid that 
it was a Soviet provocation ,111I'lIIpl; tlw 
problem of the proper amount of fon:l' 
the Coast {~uurd could IIS(~ 10 rl~triev(! 
the mun from the water; and, the 
problem of what to do if the defector 
~ot in tile Vigilant whill' t\ nwrieans 
remained on board the Soviet ship. lie 
advised Dahlgren that the Coast Guard 
should do nothing to entice the 
defector, that until the defector was on 
board the Vigilant till! State Department 
could offer no further advil!e, but that 
once till! man was on board, the State 
Department should be notified. 
Mr. Killham later indicated that he 
believes his advice to Captain Dahlgren 
did adequately eover the possibility of 
what could be done if the man 
alleml'ted to ddeeL by jumping from 
the Soviet ship into the water but that 
further information was needed before 
the State Department could render 
ndviee rl'lalivI~ to the problem of whnt 
to do if the defector got in the Vigilant 
while all or a portion of the U.S. 
del(~gation or Vigilant personnel were 
still 011 board the Soviet ship. It wns for 
this reason that he advised Dahlgren 
that the State Department could give no 
further advice until the defector was on 
board and the State Departm('nt so 
notified. I\lr. Killham later indicated 
that he did not specifically advisl~ 
Dahlgrc~n that till' Coast <;uard should 
retain the IIc.fI~ctor until advice was 
receivI:d from the State Department hilt 
thal h(' could not imaginl' anyonl' 
returning a Ih~rl:ctor without first 
obtaining such advice. 1 t 
As soon as Captain Brown had 
compldl·d his tl'l':l'hqnie convl:rsation 
with I{('ar Admir:t1 Hmnmond, he plaeed 
a call to Rear Admiral Ellis, the regular 
Commander, ~'irst Coast Guard District, 
who was horne on convalescent leave. 
The time was I :~o p.m. when Brown 
briefed Ellis relative to the Vigilant 
message and his conversation with 
Hammond. Ellis indicated concern re-
~arding till! pO!;sihility of ,\ defec:lion 
bl'emls!' till' Sovil'l vI's,;el had l'ntl'l"l'll 
lI.S. lI'rritorial wali'rs by I'rop!'r invita-
tion mill a Ih·fl·l~ti()1I eould disrupt till' 
talks of consid!'rable interest to the 
fishing iIHlustry. HI' was also eoncerned 
when he was informed that U.S. 
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personnel WI~rI! still on the Sovid ship. 
It was for these reasons that he told 
Brown, "If we gel the defector, we 
should give him back."1 2 After this 
eonversation was completed, Brow'n 
turned lo an officer on the staff and 
stated, "We arc going to relurn the 
man.,,13 The time was l:30 p.m. Brown 
then went to thc Communications 
Centcr where he drafted and sent his 
instructions in reply to the Vigilant's 
message. The text of such message 
follows: 
A. YOUR 231743Z NOV 70 
l. TAKE NO DIRECT OR 
OVERT-ACTION. HOWEVER BE 
l' IU:P ARE!) TO LAUNCII 
SMALL BOAT LM"'IEDIATEL Y. 
2. GET CDR EUSTIS BACK 
ABOARD USING ANY PRI<:-
TEXT. 
3. COMDT NOTIFIED OF 
SITUATION. 
4. IF MAN GOES IN W AT 1m 
<:lVE USSR EVERY OPPOR-
TUNITYTO RECOVER.14 
Thig IIII$sagc: was not reeeived by till: 
Vigilant until 3::~6 p.m., aboul 2 hours 
afll:r it w,is released with an opr:rations 
im llll:dia le I'rI~eedl·lH:e. 
i\leanwhile, haek in the Vigilal1t, 
Lieulenant COlllmander Pakos had al-
ready laken sleps to notify COlllmandl:r 
Eustis of till! (l()!;.';ihle defl:dion. At 
12:45 p.m. he had sl:nt a messengel· lo 
the Soviet vessel with two old search 
and rescue messages to deliver to Eustis 
as a strnta~cm to get him back aboard 
the Vigilant. Eustis returned to the 
Vigilant at 12:52 p.m. and was met hy 
Pakos who said nothing about the 
possihle defection until they had 
reached Eustis' captain's cahin. TIII're 
P<lkos told Eustis <III till' known fads 
("olll'l'rning till' poSoo;ihlt· IIt.fI·dion arlll 
showl'd him the II\I'ssage III: had earlil'r 
sent to the Fir,;l Coast Guard District. 
Eustis concluded llwl l:vell withoul 
encouragement from anyone in the 
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Vigilant an attempt to defect was 
inevitable and that such attempt would 
most likely occur while the ships were 
unmooring at the conclusion of the 
talks. He decided that the best course of 
action was to continue the talks as if no 
indication of a possible defection had 
been noted. As a precaution, he 
instructed Pakos to ensure there was no 
encouragement givcn to the possible 
defector by any member of the 
Vigilant's crew. Eustis returned to the 
Sovietskaya Litva at about 1:45 p.m., 
and, while looking for the conference 
room, he met and was engaged in 
conversation by the Soviet First Mate, 
Smilir S. Grumaurker. 
As all of the foregoing activity was 
taking place, Kudirka continued to 
attempt to communicate with Lieu-
tenant Lundberg, by raising his eye-
brows in an inquisitive manner, as if to 
query the propriety of the defection. 
Lundberg, in accordance with instruc-
tions received from Pakos, made no 
response and gave no signal to K udirka. 
At about 2 p.m. Kudirka threw a 
package of Soviet cigarettes to Lund-
berg who was still standing on the port 
wing of the Vigilant's bridge. Lundberg 
felt a bulge in the cigarette pack, said 
"thank you," and smoked one of the 
cigarettes on the bridge in an effort not 
to arouse any Soviet suspicion. He then 
went into the pilot house, tore open the 
cigarette package, and found a hand-
written note about 2 inches square with 
handwritten matter on both sides. One 
side read: 
My dear Comrade I will up down 
of russians ship and go with you 
together. If it is a possible please 
give me signal. I keep a sharp 
100kout=Simas 
The other side read: 
I up down in the time when the 
conference is End, and your 
delegats l sic] go into your ships a 
Board! 1 5 
Lundberg passed this note to Pakos 
who immediately sent a messenger to 
the Soviet ship to recal! Eustis to the 
Vigilant in the same manner as before. 
The messenger found Eustis still talking 
to the Soviet First Mate. The conversa-
tion was terminated, and Eustis re-
turned to his ship where he was shown 
Kudirka's note. He prepared and re-
leased, at 2:23 p.m., a message (date 
time group 231923Z) to the First Coast 
Guard District, the text of which 
follows: 
A. MY 231743Z NOV 70 
1. VIG CO AWARE OF SITUA-
TION. 
2. NOTE FROM SOVIET CREW 
MEMBER OF SOVEFTAUA 
rSIC] LITVA INDICATES ES-
CAPE ATTEMPT PLANNED 
WHEN VIGILANT IS READY 
TO DEPART. 
3. REQUEST GAY HEAD CG 
HA VE SUITABLE BOAT 
STANDING BY OUTSIDE 
JETTY COMMENCING 
231530Q. BOAT SHOULD BE 
INSTRUCTED TO REMAIN FAR 
AWAY FROM VIGILANT 
UNTIL VIGILANT HAD DE-
PARTlm SOVIET VESSEL. AT 
THAT TIME BOAT SHOULD 
PROCEED TO VIGILANT FOR 
INSTRUCTIONS AND BE PRE-
PARED TO PICKUP MAN IN 
WATER} 6 
Due to communications difficulLies or 
failures, the above message, with an 
operations immediate precedence, was 
not received by the First Coast Guard 
District until 6:38 p.m. the same day. 
After he released the foregoing message, 
Eustis went to the bridge of the Vigilant 
where hc observed Kudirka who spoke 
Lo him illllieating LhaL III: mighL Iry Lo 
swim to the Vigilant. Eustis showed no 
indication of undersLanding or en-
couragement to Kudirka. Eustis de-
parted the bridge and returned to the 
Soviet vessel at 2:45 p.m. He entered 
the conference room where the talks 
were being held and quietly informed 
Mr. Gordon, the National Marine 
Fisheries Service representative, of the 
possible defection. He suggested that 
they try to conclude the conference as 
soon as possible. By the time all 
conversations and farewell toasts were 
completed, the time was approaching 4 
p.m. The unmooring was not immedi-
ate, however, because the Soviet Fleet 
Commander had earlier expressed a 
desire to visit the Vigilant. Eustis felt 
obliged to invitc a group of about a 
dozen Soviet officers aboard the Vigi-
lant. They remained on board a few 
minutcs and began departing shortly 
after 4 p.m. in groups of three or four 
inasmuch as the transfer net would not 
comfortably hold more. Eustis stopped 
by his cabin on the way to the bridge to 
make preparations for unmooring and 
getting underway. 
Back in Boston, Captain Brown had 
gathered Capt. William E. Murphy, 
Comdr. John F. Curry, and Comdr. 
Jerome V. Flanagan, the Acting Chief of 
the Operations Division, the Chief, 
Intclligence and Law Enforcement 
Branch, and the District Legal Officer, 
respectively, in his office for a confer-
ence. They discussed the prospective 
defection in general terms and specifi-
cally discussed what to do if the 
defeetor got into the water or if he 
somehow got in the Vigilant. They 
talked about cases of defection and 
asylum they had read or heard about in 
the past. The consensus was that a final 
decision on the issue of returning the 
defector to the Soviet ship should be 
based upon guidance from the Com-
mandant of the Coast Guard and/or the 
State Department. Flanagan reiterated 
his view that if the defector got aboard 
the Vigilant, the Coast Guard should 
keep him on board, take him to 13oston, 
and turn him over to the State 
Department or Immigration Service. 
The conference terminated shortly 
605 
before 3:30 p.m. at which time Brown 
telephoned Rear Admiral Ellis at his 
home. He told him that he had heard 
nothing further from the Vigilant (as 
noted above, the Vigilant message 
advising him of Kudirka's note was 
released at 2:23 p.m. but was not 
received at the District Headquarters 
until 6:38 p.m.), and he had received no 
guidance from Coast Guard Head-
quarters in Washington. He then in-
formed Ellis of the consensus of the 
opinion of his staff officers with whom 
he had just finished conferring. Ellis 
stated that his mind was not changed by 
such consensus of opinion of the staff 
officers because there were no known 
new facts. 1 7 
Captain Dahlgren telephoned Captain 
Brown in Boston at 3:45 p.m., related 
the advice Mr. Killham had given and 
that the State Department had re-
quested to be notified when the man 
was on board the Vigilant. Shortly 
thereafter, Captain Dahlgren returned tQ 
Rear Admiral Hammond's office and 
briefed him on what had occurred since 
their last meeting. 
ClIptain Brown telephoned \tear 
Admiral Hammond in \V ashington at 
4: 12 p.m. and stated that he had not 
receivcd any further information from 
thc Vigilant. The two men diseU!;sed the 
nature of the advice received from the 
State Department. Hammond told 
Brown to call Coast Guard Headquarters 
when the defector was on board the 
Vigilant. There was no discussion 
regarding return of the defector to the 
Soviets. Brown asked whether he should 
catch his regular commuter service to 
his residence. Hammond told him that 
there did not appear to be any reason 
why he should 110t go home. Captain 
Dahlgren was in Hammond's office and 
was also on the telephonc with Brown 
and 1I11mmond during the foregoing 
conversation. 
Lt. Gg.) Wayne D. Tritbough, the 
duty officer in Coast Guard Head-
quarters Flag Plot, was briefed in Rear 
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Admiral Hammond's orfice on Lhis 
matLer. If tlwre wa:-; a defection he was 
Lo be advised by someone from the First 
District in Boston and he was Lo pass 
such information Lo the SLaLe Depart-
ment. Tritbough had the impression 
thaL once the dpfeetor was in Lhe 
Vigilant the SLate Department would 
detcrmine what furLher action was to be 
taken. He recalls havin/!: heard nOLhing 
said concerning returning the defector 
to the Sovids. 
AL approximaLely 4::W p.m. Captain 
Dahlgren Lelephoned I\lr. K iIIhmn aL Lhe 
State DeparLmenL and told him that no 
further information regarding the defec-
tion had been reeeived from the First 
Coast Guard DisLricL. He advised KiII-
ham that the CoasL Guard Flag Plot 
duty officer would keep the StaLe 
DeparLment informed if anything fur-
ther developed. Thereafter, Killham 
briefed his at'sisLant, Mr. Edward A. 
Mainland, Desk Officer, Bilateral Sec-
tion, Office of Soviet Affairs, Depart-
ment of State, who was the Soviet Oet'k 
duty offi(:er for thaL evening. Neither 
Killhmn nor I'vlainlmlll briefed the SLate 
Department Operations C('nter watdl 
officer regarding this maLLer. 
In Roston, CapLain Brown left his 
office at 4:30 p.m. wiLhout furtlwr 
disclll:'sing the matter with his staff. 
Brown did not assign anyone on his 
staff, and no Olll\ assumed, respon-
sibility with respect to this case. Captain 
Murphy and Commander Curry did, 
however, call the First District Head-
quarters later in the evening for 
briefings on the status of the matter. 
The Defection and Resulting Action. 
Meanwhile, back in the Vigilant, evening 
colors were held at 4:08 p.m., and it 
was dark wiLhin a few minutes there-
after. AL 4: 15 p.m. only Lhree of lht' 
Sovid offieert' who had been inviled 
aboard remained on the Vigilant. 
Lieutenant Commander Pakos was on 
the port wing of the bridge. He noLiecd 
Kudirka was standing opposiLe him on 
lhe SovieL ship. KlIdirka looked down at 
Lhe forecasLlc as if to ask whcther that 
would be a good place to come aboard 
the Vigilant. Pakos was, however, 
looking down toward the boaL deck. 
Kudirka stared at Pakos. Pakos shrugged 
his shoulders. Kudirka disappean·d from 
Pakos' view. A few minutes later, aL 
about 4:20 p.m., Kudirka surprised 
Pakos as he appeared on the bridge of 
the Vigilant He had apparenLly jumped 
from the Soviet ship lo a low('r d(~ek 
I(~vd of the Vi[{ilullt. Kudirka (·mhrae(·d 
Pakos and l:alle(1 him "I:omrade."\ H 
Kudirka seemed to be very happy. 
Pakos quickly removed Kudirka from 
the bridge and had him taken lo Lhe 
watehstander's hea(!. Pakos assigned Ll. 
(jg.) Richard E. Burke, Jr., to guard the 
defector but had Burke relieved by a 
ercwmember a few minutes later. 
Commander EusLis was sLiII in his cabin 
when Pakos arrived and report(:d Lhal 
the defector was aboard the Vigilant. 
Commander Eustis concluded that he 
would have a problem if the Soviets had 
ob~('rv(~d or were ;tW;tr\: of th(· d(·f(·(!-
Lion. lie went to Ilw hrill/!,' and lh('r(~ 
oJ,SI'rv(~d Ilm'(! Sovil·t offie('rs :-;liII 
slanding on the Vigilant's nighL (let:k 
bu L making no effort to return to Lheir 
~hip. 1~lIstis r!'LlIrlwd lo his (·ahin. I"~ 
was noL aware of the spedfil:s or ll.S. 
policy regarding political asylum but 
had heard of other defections, ;tnd he 
Lhought Kudirka would be granted 
asylum. He did not consider returning 
Kudirka to the Soviets. LieuLenant 
Morehouse, the observer from Coast 
Guard Headquarters, entered Eustis' 
cabin and was informed of the defec-
tion .. Eustis asked his advice to which 
Morehouse replied that WashingLon 
should be advised. The two officers 
wenL to the bridge to eontacL the FirsL 
Coast (~uard OisLriet and report the f;td 
th'll the defector W;tS ou bourll Lhe 
Vigilant Lieutenant Lundberg was in-
terviewing Kudirka about this Lime. He 
was the first of the Vigilant's officers Lo 
do so. 
Commander Eustis called the First 
District Headquarters, rcquested a tele-
phone patch with either Captain Brown 
or Commander Curry, and was informed 
that neither one of them was available 
as they were: en route to their homes. 
He then called Rear Admiral Ellis at 
5: ] 5 p.m. Eustis told Ellis that the 
defector was aboard but thc Soviets had 
not yet asked for his return. Ellis 
replied, 
] n vicw of the nature of present 
arrangcmcnts with them and in 
the interest of not fouling up any 
of our arrangements as far as the 
fishing situation is concerned, I 
think they should know this and 
if thcy choose to do nothing, keep 
him on board, otherwise put him 
back.! 9 
Eustis acknowledged these instructions 
and commented that if the defector 
jumped overboard from the Soviet ship 
after having been returned and as the 
Vigilnllt departed, he would attempt to 
pick him up. Rllis replied that, in that 
event, tllll Soviets shonld havI! the first 
opportunity to pick him up and at the 
same lime he cautioned Eustis to make 
sure the Vigilant did 1I0t preempt the 
Soviets ill taking that at:lion. Eustis then 
stated that the Vigilant would get 
underway shortly and he would keep 
the District advised of the situation as it 
progressed.20 
At the conclusion of the telephone 
patch, Rear Admiral Ellis told Lt. 
Kcnneth N. Ryan, the duty officer at 
the Rescue Coordination Center, Dis-
trict Headquarters, to contact Captain 
Brown and inform him of the conversa-
tion with Cornman per Eustis. Ellis 
stated he realized that he had inter-
jected himself betwcen Brown and 
Eustis. 
Back in the Vigilallt the tillle was 
5:20 1'.111. and Lieutenant Morehonse 
had gone to Commander Eustis' cabin 
and found four Soviets there, including 
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Fleet Comdr. Ivan A. Burkal, Com-
mander of the Lithuanian Fleet, and the 
Soviet interpreter, Genrikar K. Bal-
trunar. Mr. Gordon and Mr. Obolensky 
were also present. The Soviets just sat 
quietly without making any conversa-
tion. No one said anything about 
Kudirka. 
After talking to Rear Admiral Ellis, 
Commander Eustis went to sec Kudirka. 
He spoke with him for a period in 
excess of one-half hour, during which 
Lime Kudirkll stated he was married and 
his home was Klaipeda, Lithuania, a 
Baltic port city. Eustis was convinced 
that Kudirka was sincere in his desire 
not to return to the Soviet ship. 
At 5:40 p.m. the Vigilant called till: 
Coast Guard Group, Woods Hole, Mass., 
and requested a small craft to rendez-
vons with them for reasons of "utmost 
political importance. ,,21 At 5:44 p.m. 
the Woods Hole Group called Lieu-
tenant Ryan, the duty officer at the 
Rescue Coordination Center, District 
Headquarters, to determine the reason 
for the requcst. Ryan told them to have 
a "44 footer" stand hy to assist till! 
Vigilant. 
The Soviet officers aboard the 
Vigilnnt indicated to Mr. Obolensky, at 
about 5:tf.5 1'.111., that tlwy knew 1\ 
crewman from their ship was ahoard the 
Vigilnnt. Mr. Obolensky mentioncd this 
to Lieutenant Morehouse who was also 
in Commander Eustis' cabin. Morehouse 
left the cabin, located Eustis, and told 
him the Soviets knew the defector was 
on board the Vigilant. They discussed 
several courses of action relative to 
keeping Kudirka secure and out of sight. 
Eustis was reluctant to go below to his 
eabin as he anticipated possible Soviet 
demands for the defector's return. The 
Soviets, however, made no effort to 
approach Eustis for this purpOl~e. 
Lieuten:ml Ryan telephoned Caplain 
Brown's residence at 5:47 p.m. in order 
to inform him of the earlier eOllv('rsa-
tion at 5:] 5 p.m. between Rear Admiral 
Ellis and Commander Eustis. Brown had 
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not as yet arrived home, but upon his 
arrival at about 6 p.m. he immediately 
called Ryan. Brown was told of the 
conversation between Ellis and Eustis 
and the instructions issued by Ellis. 
Ryan also told Brown of the Vigilant's 
request for the small craft from Woods 
Hole. Brown commentcd to Ryan that 
the preferred course of action might be 
to keep the defector in the Vigilant and 
take him to New Bedford. He thcn 
directed Ryan to notify Flag Plot at 
Coast Guard Heudqllarters that the 
defector was abourd the Vigilant. They 
decided, however, that they should first 
contact the Vigilant to ascertain if the 
defector was still on board. At 6: II 
p.m. Ryan reached the Vigilant by 
means of a telephone patch. Eustis left 
the watchstander's head, where he was 
talking to Kudirka, to take the call. He 
told Ryan the defector was still on 
board, that Kudirka was in fear of his 
life, and that Kudirka had indicated that 
regardless of what the Coast Guard did, 
he would go over the side and hope for 
the best. Eustis requested a telephone 
patch be made with Brown. 
Th~ telephone patch with Brown was 
completed at about 6: 15 p.m. Eustis 
told Brown that the defector and four 
other Soviets were uboard the Vigilant, 
that the ddector was sincere in his 
intent to defect, and of the defector's 
comments regarding going over the side. 
He also told Brown that the Soviets 
knew the defector was on board the 
Vigilant, but that he thought the Soviets 
on board the Vigilant would leave if so 
requested. Brown, at this time, stated, 
"This is a situation which is going to 
have to be resolved by the State 
Department.,,22 He instructed Eustis to 
request the Soviets to return to their 
ship. This conversation coneluded with 
u COJlnllent by Brown that he was /!oing 
to call Bear Admiral Ellis. Brown 
im.tructcd Lieutenant B yun to wait 
before calling Flag Plot at Coast Guard 
Headquarters. The time was 6::m p.m. 
Captain Brown called Rear Admiral 
Ellis immediately after the foregoing 
conversation was terminated, apologized 
for interrupting his dinner, told him he 
had just talked with Commander Eustis 
and whut the laller hud said. Brown also 
told Ellis that he had instructed Eustis 
to keep the defector in seclusion and to 
ask the Soviets on board the Vigilant to 
leave in order to give the First District 
time to contact the Commandant of the 
Coast Guard for further advicc. He 
informed Ellis that the only advice he 
had received from the Commandant lip 
to that time coneernl~d whut to do in 
the event the defector jumped in the 
water. He did not tell Ellis that the 
Commandant wanted to be kept advised 
of developments in the case. Ellis told 
Brown that the Vigilant should not 
return the man without a request from 
the Soviets, but if they did make such a 
request the defector should be returned 
to them.23 
Captain Brown made a telephone 
patch with the Vigilant at 6:45 p.m. and 
talked with Lieutenant Commander 
Pakos initially and later Commundcr 
Eustis. Pakos told him thut Ellstis was in 
the process of asking the Soviets to 
return to their ship. Brown wanted to 
know whether the Soviets had been 
asked if they desired the dl'fl~etor's 
rt:lllrn. lie told Pakm; that if tlw Sovil'ls 
had requested the defector's return, the 
man was to be returned to the Soviet 
vessel. Pakos told him that he would 
'pass these instructions to Eustis and 
would call him right back. The time was 
6:47 p.m. As Brown waited for the 
return call, he telephoned Rear Admiral 
Ellis at 6:48 p.m. and reported Com-
mander Eustis' earlier statement re-
garding the possibility that the defector 
would go over the side of the Soviet 
ship if he was retiJrned. The decision to 
return the ddector, if so n'qul~sll'd hy 
the Sovil'ls, WIIS not ulll'rI'd hy this hil 
of information. At 6:5·t. p,m, Ellslis 
talked to Brown, aeknowh~dl!l'd that 
Pakos had passed the instructions to 
him, stated that the Soviets had not 
made a formal request for the defector's 
return, and expressed the opinion that if 
the defector was returned to the Soviets 
his life would probably be in jeopardy. 
At that point Brown directed Eustis to 
get a positive answer from the master of 
the Soviet vessel as to whether he 
wanted the defector returned to the 
Soviet ship. Brown again stated that if 
the Soviets wanted the defector back he 
would be returned to the Soviet vessel. 
At this point Eustis indicated that Mr. 
Gordon, the representative of the 
National Marine Fisheries Service, De-
partment of Commerce, was standing by 
to offer his informed opinion on the 
matter, but Brown stated the fisheries 
agent had no responsibility in the case 
of the defector. Eustis stated that he 
anticipated the Soviets would make a 
request for the defeetor's return and 
again commented that Kudirka said he 
would make an attempt to jump into 
the water once he was back aboard the 
Soviet ship. 
Commander Eustis was ordered by 
Captain Brown to take all necessary 
precautions to prevent an incident from 
occurring, particularly during the tran&-
fer of the defector from the Vigilant to 
the Sovietskaya Litva. Brown empha-
si7.ed during this conversation that there 
must be a formal rcquest from the: 
Soviet master of the defector's ship 
before the defector could be returned. 
The conversation was terminated at 
7:28 p.m. 
At 7:30 p.m. Captain Brown tele-
phoned Rear Admiral Ellis and in-
formed him of Commander Eustis' 
concern for Kudirka's safety and his 
opinion that Kudirka's life would be in 
jeopardy if he was returned to the 
Soviets. To this Ellis responded" "I 
don't think we have any reason' to 
believe that thh; would happen. l'hey 
are not haruarians. ,,24 Ellis ('onclud('el 
tlHlt the information r('gardin~ Eustis' 
('on('('rn for Kudirka 's wcll.uein~ did not 
change the situation so as to affect his 
earlier decision to return Kudirka to the 
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Soviets. This telephone call concluded 
Ellis' involvement in the case for 2'3 
November 1970. He neither received 
nor made any additional calls con-
cerning the matter that date. 
At 8 p.m. the Soviets presented a 
written document which requested 
Kudirka's return. The document was 
addressed to the Leader of the United 
States Delegation as well as the Captain 
of the Vigilant and was signed by the 
Captain of the Sovietskaya Litva, 
Vladimir M. Popov. The text of the 
request follows: 
During our meeting on November 
23, 1970, the radio operator 
KUDlRKA penetrated into my 
stateroom, forced the safe, took 
money from the safe in the 
amount of 3,000 rubles jumped 
over the fender and hid on your 
vessel. Request you conduct a 
search and rcturn him to my 
vessel. I lodge a maritime protest 
on this matter.25 
Commander Eustis considered the above 
wriUcn request to satisfy Captain 
Brown's requirement of a "formal 
request. " 
tu 8:04 p.m. Mr. Gordon placed a 
te\(:l'hone patch to SOIlWOIIC he klll:W ill 
thc State Departmcnt but could not 
locate him. Mr. Obolcnsky and Mr. 
Gordon suggestcd that Commander 
Eustis carry Kudirka back to the U.S. 
mainland and require the Soviets to seck 
his return to them through diplomatic 
channels. Lieutcnant Morehouse advised 
Eustis that thc State Department should 
be contacted. 
Commander Eustis called Captain 
Brown at 8: 19 p.111., via telephone 
patch, informed him that he' had the 
wriUen request f9r Kudirka's return, 
that he intended 1<> return the de·fC'C'lor 
to tlw Soviet vessel, Jhat tlw VigilaILt 
would escort the s.ovj~J. vessel from the: ' 
territorial waters 6C:~lre United States, 
that should the defc~ior jump into the 
610 
water after having been returned to the 
Sovietskaya Litva the Vigilant would 
stand e1ear and make no attempt to 
rescue him unless his safety or life was 
in jeopardy. Such plan of action was 
consistent with the instructions of Rear 
Admiral Ellis as given in the 5: 15 p.m. 
conversation and with those in Captain 
Brown's conversation at 6:45 p.m. 
Brown told Eustis to proceed in 
accordance with his total message. 
Commander. Eustis informed the 
Soviets that Kudirka would be returned 
to the Soviet ship. He then went to visit 
Kudirka and asked him to voluntarily 
return to the Soviet ship. After some 
conversation, Eustis thought he had 
convinced Kudirka to voluntarily return 
because Kudirka wenl with him from 
the watchstander's head to the com-
manding officer's cabin. Upon arrival at 
such cabin, Kudirka saw Fleet Com-
mander Burkal, stopped, cried "no, no," 
turned, and ran away from the eabin.26 
Eustis followed him, conversed with 
him again, but was unable to persuade 
him to return to the Soviet ship. 
Finally, at about 9 p.m., Eustis told the 
Soviet officials still on board the 
V;gilant they could take Kudirka back 
with them. At that time the Soviet 
officers went to talk with Kudirka. 
Fleet Commander Burkal spoke with 
him. The conversation was heated, and 
Kudirka vehemently insisted that he 
would not return t6 the Soviet ship 
under any circumstances. At 9:30 p.m. 
the Soviets had also been unable to 
persuade Kudirka to voluntarily return 
to the Soviet ship. They were reluctant, 
however, to use force. They requested 
Eustis to use his crewmen to return the 
defector to the Sovietskaya Litva. 
Eustis' refusal of such request resulted 
in a Soviet request that a telephone call 
be placed for them to the Sovid 
Embm:sy in Wm:hington. Eustis :lsk(,11 his 
radioman wlll'tlwr su('h :t cnll coulc! be 
madc. Thinking he desired the line, the 
radioman placed the call lit 9:45 p.m. 
The telephone patch between the 
V;gilant and the Soviet Embassy re-
mained open for approximately 5 
minutes, but no communication was 
passed. Eustis later indicated that he did 
not want the Soviets calling their 
Embassy from his ship until the Coast 
Guard and the State Department had 
been notified of their desire to do so. 
Back in Boston, immediately after 
the 8: 19 p.m. t~lephone conversation 
between Captain Brown and Com-
mander Eustis, Lieutenant Ryan, who 
had been listening to that conversation, 
suggested to Brown that Coast GUllrd 
Headquarters be contacted concerning 
the case. Brown concurred. At 8:24 
p.m. Ryan called Flag Plot at Coast 
Guard Headquarters and talked with 
Lieutenant Tritbough. He reported that 
the defector had gotten aboard the 
Vigilant and had asked to remain bu t 
was being returned at the request of the 
Soviet master and that the defector was 
being returned in the custody of Soviet 
officials. Ryan also indicated that the 
defector did not desire to go back to the 
Soviet ship, and it was anticipated that 
he would jump overboard therdrom if 
hI: had the chanee. lIe informed 
Tritbough that the V;gilant was alerted 
to this possibility. 
Lieutenant Tritbough had been 
briefed on this maLLeI' earlil:r in thl: day 
and had expected the telephone call 
from Ryan. He logged the telephone call 
in the Flag Plot Log at 8: 30 p.m. Hc 
had taken notes of what hc considered 
to be the important points of the 
conversation in order to telephonically 
brief Rellr Admiral Hammond, the Chief 
of Staff, the Assistant Commandant, 
and the Commandant of the COllst 
Guard. All the foregoing telephone eulls 
were made within 15 minutes after the 
telephone call was received from "Bos. 
Lon. A CLer reeeiving the 1::111 from 
'I'rit h()u~h, 111111111101111 I!Ondtlll.·c! t hnt 
the informlltion 'I'rith()u~h WIIH IlItll.~ing 
meant Lhut the return of till: c!dedor 
was in the process of taking plat:I:, or 
had already taken place by that time, 
and the case was closed. I n fact, 
however, the return of the defector did 
not take place until more than 3 hours 
later, as will be subsequently reportcd in 
this article. Hammond also concludcd 
that the defector had voluntarily re-
turned to the Soviet ship. This con-
clusion was also erroncous. 
Lieutenant Tritbough tclephoned the 
State Departmcnt Operations Center at 
8:45 p.m. and talked with Mr. Kevin J. 
McGuire, the assistant watch officer. 
Neither the senior nor the assistant 
watch officer at the Operations Center 
had received any specific instructions 
concerning this case, but a copy of the 
Vigilnnt's 12:43 p.m. message was 
posted on the Operations Center reading 
board. Although there were tape re-
corders present in both the Flag Plot 
duty offiee and the State Department 
Operations Center, neither of these 
machines were functioning. There is no 
transcript or recording of the conversa-
tion between Tritbough and McGuire. 
This is unfortunate because the evidence 
is in dispute as to what was said 
concerning certain matters. Lieutenant 
Tritbough claims to have used his notes 
to rclate the substance of the message 
he had received from Lieutenant Ryan 
in Roston to McGuire. He states that he 
said the defector "is being returned" 
and that the Vigilant would escort the 
Soviet ship to international waters. He 
further states that he used no words 
which, in his opinion, suggested that the 
matter had been finally resolved.2 7 
Tritbough requested that his report be 
passed to the Soviet Desk within the 
State Department. McGuire, on the 
other hand, states that Tritbough told 
him the case had been resolved. As 
earlier noted, Lieutenant Tritbough 
denies using any words which suggested 
the matter had been finally resolved. 
Mr. McGuire also claims that he read a 
summary of their conversation to 
Lieutenant Tritbough and the latter 
approved it before the conversation 
ended. Lieutenant Tritbough does not 
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re(:all any.sueh reading or giving his 
approval of any such summary.28 
Mr. McGuire, at the suggestion of the 
senior watch officer, notified the 
European Area duty officer that evening 
and Mr. Mainland, the Soviet Desk duty 
officer. Mainland telephoned Flag Plot 
at Coast Guard Headquarters, awakened 
Licutenant Tritbough at 11:30 p.m., 
and asked if there were any new 
devclopments in the case. Tritbough 
informed Mainland that he had received 
no new information since his last report 
to the State Department, but a situation 
report was expected the next morning. 
As the foregoing activity was taking 
place in Washington, the problems in 
the Vigilnnt had not subsided. Com-
mander Eustis and Lieutenant Com-
mander Pakos discussed the situation, 
and Pakos had drafted a message which 
he proposed be sent to the First District 
and an information copy be sent to the 
Commandant of the Coast Guard. The 
message recommended that the Vigilant 
depart the Soviet vessel with the 
defector on board and that the State 
Department decide what to do with him 
as an alternative to the instructions 
issued to the Vigilnnt thus far in the 
case. Eustis decided not to use the 
m(~s."ap;e ll(~eausc he considered that 
sending an information copy to the 
Commandant would not be following 
the chain of command. He assumed that 
Coast Guard Headquarters had been 
kept properly informed. Instead of 
sending the message, its important 
points were summarized as a note for 
Eustis to refer to in a telephone 
conversation with Captain Brown. The 
three important points of the note were 
that the Soviets were reluctant to use 
their own men to forcibly return the 
defector to the Soviet ship, that the 
Soviets desired to consult with their 
Embas."y ill \V a~hingtoll, and llHlt Em;lis 
recommendcd an altcrnate solution of 
the problem by retaining Kudirka on 
board the Vigilant and requiring the 
Soviets to request his return through 
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diplomatic channels. Eustis called 
Brown at 10:14 p.m. and advised him 
that the situation aboard the Vigilant was 
tense, and that force would be necessary 
to return the defector to the Soviet 
ship. Eustis does not recall whether he 
communicated all three of the above 
enumerated points to Brown because 
during the conversation Brown said, 
"Y ou have your orders. You have no 
discretion. Use whatever force is neces-
sary. Do not let an inciden t occur. ,,29 
Brown's attitude was formal and firm at 
the time. Eustis concluded that he had 
received a direct order and that he must 
comply therewith. 
The Return. After his last conversa-
tion with Captain Brown, Commander 
Eustis returned to his cabin and 
reluctantly told the Soviets, "He's all 
yours. ,,30 The Soviets told Eustis they 
wanted to use six men to return 
Kudirka. Eustis suggested that the 
Soviets then present take Kudirka 
themselves, but they declined to do so. 
He then realized that they considered 
that it would not be proper for them as 
officers to struggle with one of their 
crew. For that reason, Eustis decided 
that they would be permitted to bring 
three crewmen aboard the Vigilant in 
order to return Kudirka to the Soviet 
ship. Eustis has later stated that he 
decided to permit the Soviets to come 
aboard the Vigilant to remove Kudirka 
for three reasons: He felt that adverse 
publicity could result from the use of 
Coast Guardsmen to forcibly return a 
defector to the Soviets; if the defector 
went overboard and was lost while 
Coast Guardsmen were attempting to 
return him, they might be accused of 
letting him escape; and, he was con-
cerned with the possible effect per-
sonnel participation in the forcible 
return of the dl~(I'et(lr would havl~ on 
the morale of his own erew. 
Five Soviet crewmen were trans-
ferred to the Vigilant by means of the 
personnel net instead of three as 
authorized by Eustis. These Soviet 
crewmen brought a hlanket, rope, and a 
ball of material which appeared to he 
socks. A Soviet crewman indicated the 
ball of material was to be placed in the 
defector's mouth. One of the Soviet 
crewmen was the second mate with 
whom Ensign Hughes had been able to 
converse earlier in the day. At about 
10:45 p.m. Eustis escorted thc Soviets 
to Kudirka where he again talked with 
Kudirka and the Soviet FII:et Com-
mander. Kudirka persisted in his refu~1 
to return to the Soviet ship. He m;krd 
for a knife for the stated purpose of 
killing himself. The request was, of 
course, denied. Kudirka told Eustis he 
would fight anyone who tried to take 
him off the Vigilant. At this point, 
Eustis turned Kudirka over to the 
Soviets. Before starting to move to a 
lower deck of the ship with the Soviets, 
Kudirka removed his shirt, emptied his 
pockets, and gave all his personal 
possessions, including some notes, 
books, and papers, to Eustis. It is noted 
that none of the ruhles which the 
Soviets alleged Kudirka had stolen were 
in his possession at this time. 
The Soviet party started down to the 
lower decks with Kudirka. As they 
neamd tlw cllptain's eahin, wlwre Ihe 
civilians in the U.S. delegation were 
located, Kudirka broke away and 
attempted to enter the cabin. He 
managed to open the cabin door before 
he was grabbed by the Soviets who tried 
to break the grip he had on the cabin 
doorknob. As this occurred, Mr. Brieze 
attempted to push the Soviets away 
from Kudirka, but Mr. Gordon in-
formed him that there had been orders 
to return Kudirka and that they must 
not interfere. The Soviets then took 
Kudirka to the port boat deck. The time 
was ahout 10:50 p.m. Eustis returned to 
hi:; c:lhin a8 mooring Rlnliom; w(~rl' 
piped, and the word was passed 10 
prepare to get underway. Upon arrival 
011 the port boat deck, Kudirka broke 
loose from the Soviet party but was 
partially restrained by the Soviets 
underneath the port motor lifeboat 
where the struggle continued. Kudirka 
then broke loose, went over the side of 
the port boat deck, and personnel in the 
Vigilant thought he went overboard into 
the water betwcen the two ships. 
Actually, however, he had swung down 
to the main deck. "Man overboard" was 
sounded throughout the Vigilant. While 
this action was taking place, a large 
number of Soviet crewmen had gathered 
at the rail of the Soviet ship. As they 
followcd the strugglc between the 
Soviets and Kudirka a few feet away on 
board the Vigilant, they screamed, 
yelled, and pointed, creating a substan-
tial commotion. These crewmen on the 
Sovietskaya Litva had seen that Kudirka 
had not gone overboard, and they tried 
to point him out to his Soviet pursuers. 
The time was about ll:OO p.m. The 
ships were moored about 3 feet apart. 
Thinking that the defector might be 
crushcd between the ships and rccog-
nizing the potential for troublc in this 
tense situation, EUl'tis gave the order to 
unmoor the Vigilant and to get 
underway immediately. Inasmuch as the 
mooring lines were bclayed or turncd 
around c1eatl' aboard thc Soviet vessel, 
all but two Iincs wer!! lI:t go by their 
bitter or inboard ends. The two other 
lines were cut with axes. During the 
unmooring, Eustis was on the bridge 
and had control of the ship. In backing 
straight down and standing clear of the 
Soviet vessel, the yard boom net rigged 
from the Soviet ship knocked down the 
Vigilant's antennas, carried away the 
forward port life lines and a port 
running light, and damaged three or 
four stanchions. 
As noted above, Kudirka did not go 
overboard as many thought when he 
broke away from the Soviets and went 
over the side of the port boat deck. He 
swung from the port boat deck to the 
main deck and ran aft on the port side 
onto the fantail of the Vigilant. Once on 
the fantail, he ran about as if he did not 
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know what to do or wherc to go. Two 
pursuing Sovicts arrived on the fantail. 
When Kudirka saw them he attempted 
to climb over the starboard taffrail but 
was grabbed by two Coast Guardsmen 
who acted spontaneously in order to 
prevent a person from going overboard. 
Within seconds the two pursuing Sovicts 
took custody of Kudirka after having 
taken him away from the two men who 
prevented him from going overboard. 
Two more Soviets arrived and joined in 
the struggle to subdue Kudirka. As they 
dragged him toward the ladder leading 
up to the flight deck, Kudirka was 
trying very hard to escape from their 
grasps. He was earried up the ladder to 
the flight deck. In the process of doing 
so, one Soviet repeatedly struck Ku-
dirka's head against the steel handrail of 
the ladder. Coast Guard crewmen on the 
fantail saw no blood or other visible 
signs of injury on Kudirka. The 
commotion on the fantail was not 
reported to the bridge by the crewman 
manning the mooring station sound-
powered telephone. . 
Earlier when "Man overboard" was 
sounded, Ensign Hughes went to the 
port side of the flight deck to look for 
the man in the water. Subsequently he 
saw Kudirka heing hrought up till: 
ladder from the fantail to the flight 
deck by the four Soviets. As the Soviets 
took Kudirka to the forward end of the 
flight deck, Hughes was able to stop one 
of the Soviets from beating Kudirka by 
talking to the Soviet second mate who 
understood some English and with 
whom he had talked earlier in the day. 
The second mate passed directions from 
Hughes to the rest of the Soviets 
attempting to control Kudirka. Hughes 
reported to the bridge that the Soviets 
were having difficulty restraining Ku-
dirka. He retumed to the flight deck, 
mill upon his arrival he stoppl~(1 the 
Soviets from beating Kudirka and tying 
him to a winch. The Soviets had tied a 
line around Kudirka's neck. Hughes 
returned to the bridge and reeorted that 
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the Soviets appeared to be trying to 
seriously injure Kudirka. Lieutenant 
Commander Pakos directed him to 
prevent the Soviets from hurting the 
defector. 
Hughes returned and moved the 
Soviets and Kudirka further forward on 
the flight deck. He received instructions 
from Pakos to take them to the mess 
deck. When the Soviets refused to go to 
the mess deck, Pakos ordered Hughes to 
take them to the helicopter shack on 
the forward end of the flight deck. The 
Soviets took Kudirka inside the heli· 
coptcr shack as directed. Hughes sta-
tioned two Coast Guard gunners mates 
outside the area where the Soviets and 
Kudirka were located. Hughes departed 
briefly, and upon his return the Soviets 
were again roughing up Kudirka. Hughes 
was again able to stop the Soviets by 
talking to the second mate. As indi-
cated, Hughes was able to stop the 
Soviet brutality several times, but 
whenever he was momentarily away 
from the Soviets they resumed mis-
treating Kudirka.31 
Orders for the Vigilant's crew to lay 
below werc passed via the ship's public 
addrcss system. Hughes and the two 
gunners mates had kept the ship's crew 
off the flight deck, directing them not 
to get involved. 
While Kudirka was in the helicopter 
shack, the Soviets wrapped him in the 
blanket and tied him up with the line 
they had brought with them from the 
Soviet ship. The Soviets attempted to 
put the blanket over his head, but he 
successfully resisted their efforts to do 
so. Kudirka had fought vigorously until 
he was completely bound, except for his 
head, in the blanket. Finally, at 11:15 
p.m. the Soviets had Kudirka under 
control. 
Commander Eustis tlwn went to thc 
boat deck whem Kudirka had tll'cn 
taken, observed him bound in the 
blanket, and expressed to Kudirka his 
sympathy and personal concern. AI-
though Kudirka said nothing, Eustis 
thought he had been undcrstood. ~~lIstis 
has stated that he saw no indication that 
Kudirka had received physical injury at 
that time.3 2 Eustis decided to use one 
of his small boats to return all the 
Soviets and Kudirka to the Soviet.~kaya 
Litva. He instructed Lieutenant Com-
mander Pakos to eon tact Captain Brown 
in order to get his permission to' do so. 
Pakos reached Brown at 11:30 p.m., 
in formed him of the situation, lmd 
requested permission to IItilh~e tllll 
Vigilant's boat to return all the S()vi(~ts 
and Kudirka to the Soviet ship. After 
receiving assurance that the weather and 
sca were satisfactory, Brown authorized 
the usc of thc Vigilant's boat. 
Ensign Hughes was in charge of the 
unarmed boat detail. At 11:40 p.m. two 
or three Soviets threw Kudirka, still 
bound in the blanket, a distance of 2 or 
3 feet into the boat. He was face down 
in the bottom of the boat with one 
Soviet sitting on his head. The Vigilant's 
boat crew did not know whether 
Kudirka was conscious at this time. 
After all hands were in the bout. it was 
lowered into tIll! water at II :41 p.lII. 
One Soviet struck Kudirka <luring the 
trip between the two ships. WI\('n tllll 
boat reudled the Sovid ship, a Iwt was 
lowered and the Soviets threw Kudirka 
into the net which was raised to the 
deck of the Sovietskaya Litva. From 
that time on it was not possible for the 
Vigilant's boat crew to observe what, if 
anything, was happening to Kudirka. 
A ftl!r the rl'st of the Soviets hoardl'd 
their ship, the small boat en'w retrit:ved 
the lines that were carried away by the 
Soviet ship when the Vigilant got 
underway. They also recovered the 
Vigilant's broken whip anlimna. The 
slIIall hoat saft·ly ret II rlll'd 10 1111' 
Vi~i1alll al II :;,;, p.m. Thl' l'i~i1111l1 
l'sl'orlell 1111' Sovid Vl'ssl'l 10 inll'rllll-
lional waters. A t 1:05 a.lII. on :.H 
November 1970, the Vigilant smll a 
message to the First Const G lIarcl 
District reporting the transfer of Ku-
dirka hud bcen accomplishcd at ] 1:55 
p.m. Sometime after Kudirka was 
returncd to the Soviet vessel, Com-
mander Eustis indicated to the civilians 
aboard the Vigilant that he felt badly 
about what had happened and hoped 
the incident would soon be forgotten. 
TIJI: Vigilant returned to New Bedford 
at 3:30 a.m. on 24 November 1970.33 
Official and Public Reaction. Tele-
vision news programs reported the 
President of the United States wus 
outraged when he learned of Kudirka's 
return to the Soviels. Secretary of State 
William P. Rogers was reported to have 
said, according to a United Press 
International report, that it was un-
believable to him that the commander 
of a Coast Guard vessel permilled Soviet 
crewmen of a fishing boat to board his 
ship and forcibly take off a Lithuanian 
defector.34 Demonstrations to protest 
the denial of political asylum to 
Kudirka occurred in New York, Boston, 
Philadelphia, Cleveland, and Chieago.3 5 
A subcommillec of the Foreign Affuirs 
Committee of the House of Representa-
tives initiated a congressional investiga-
tion of the eaSl: and made periodic 
rel('us($ 10 the m:ws llI!'dia of IWWS 
concerning its proeeedings.3 6 Both the 
Coast Guard and tlw State Department 
also initiated investigations of their 
own. 
After reeeiving and reviewing the 
report of the Board of Investigation in 
the ease, the Commandant of the Coast 
Guard approved the recommendation of 
the board concerning establishing beller 
liaison with the State Department and 
initiation of a review of the communi-
cations difficulties experienced by the 
Vigilant and the First Coast Guard 
Distriet to d!'termine what ehanlrl's, if 
,IllY, IIIay 11(: lJ('el's~ul)'. Wilh n'/?;:trll 10 
the !,l'r:'onn!'1 USpl~l'ts of till' !'USI', IIII' 
Comlllundant reviewI:d till: n'('on"III'n-
dutions of till' IlOurd und took udion us 
indicated below: 
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Recommendution ]. That CAPT 
BROWN be awarded a General 
Court-Martial for trial on charges 
of Dereliction of Duty for his 
failure to inform the Comman-
dant of the progress of the case 
and for his failure to retain the 
defector aboard the Vigilant until 
having advice from proper au-
thority •••. 
Recommendation No. 1 is con-
curred in. In spite of the fact that 
CAPT BROWN should have excr-
cised independently his authority 
as Acting District Commander, I 
am convinced that he was mark-
edly influenced in his course of 
action by the forceful advice he 
had received from RADM ELLIS. 
There is liLllc doubt that regard-
less of the results of a trial CAPT 
BROWN's performance during 
this entire incident has seriously 
impaired his effectiveness as a 
senior captain on active duty. For 
these reasons, if CAPT BROWN 
immediately submits a request for 
retirement, I shall aece!'t it and 
not refer the charge for trial, but 
rather wiII issue a Punitive Letter 
o[ Reprimand under Artieh: J!i of 
the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice. 
Reeommendation 2. That RADM 
ELLIS be issued a Punitive Letter 
of Reprimand from the Comman-
dant for offering instruction or 
advice without having informed 
himself of the facts and policy 
necessary for a proper decision, all 
to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline in the service; that he be 
removed from command and 
m;kecl to retire as soon as his 
IlI'ulth I)('r",il~ hUI nol lull'r Ih:", 
:31 J :lIIl1ary 1971; und thut in the 
intl:rim he be a~signed to a 
p()~iti()n of minilllal responsi-
bilities. 
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Recommendation No. 2 is not 
concurred in. It is true that 
RAOM'" ELLIS disobeyed no 
orders; he was not, in fact, in the 
chain of command at the time of 
the incident. Nevertheless, he gave 
advice having the force of orders 
and adhered to his position firmly 
and even stubbornly in spite of 
the fact that he was informed that 
principal staff officers were not in 
agreement with his position and in 
spite of the fact that he knew that 
advice had been sought from the 
Commandant. His actions prompt-
ing the recommendation for a 
Punitive Letter of Reprimand 
were such as to make him no lcss 
responsible in the matter than 
CAPT BROWN. Accordingly, I 
direct the Board to embody the 
misconduct it found to exist in an 
appropriate charge or charges and 
specifications. I find such charges 
should be referred for trial by 
court-martial. In this instance 
however, as in the instance of 
CAPT BROWN, there is little 
doubt that regardless of the 
results of a trial, RAOM ELLIS' 
performance during the incident 
has seriously impaired his effec-
tiveness as a flag officer on active 
duty. For this reason, if RAOM 
ELLIS immediately submits a 
request for retirement, I shall 
accept it and not refer the charge 
or charges for trial, but rather will 
issue a Punitive Letter of Repri-
mand under Article 15 of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice. 
Recommendation 3. That CDR 
EUSTIS be issued an Adminis-
trative Letter of Reprimand from 
the Commandant for allowing 
Soviet crewmcmbl'rs IIbo:\rd his 
vessel to removc a Soviet defcctor 
without exercising upon thl' (sic) 
proper restraints; and that he be 
immediately reassigned from the 
Vigilant. 
Recommendation 3 is concurred 
in to the extent that CDR 
EUSTIS be issued an Administra-
tive Letter of Reprimand (non-
punitive). I do not concur in the 
stated reason for the issuance of 
this letter. I recognize that CDR 
EUSTIS found himself in a 
difficult and trying situation. He 
had been told to use whatever 
force was neecssary to return the 
defector to his vessel. It is 
apparent that he had become 
emotionally affected by the un-
happy predicament in which the 
defector had been placed. While I 
can sympathize with his position, 
I cannot conc(~ive of any com-
manding officcr interpreting 
orders authorizing the use of 
necessary force so as to permit 
foreign nationals to exercise au-
thority on board a Coast Guard 
vessel, whether or not proper 
restraints were imposed. CDR 
EUSTIS erred in allowing the 
Soviet vessel's crewmen to exer-
cise any control of the defector 
while on board the Vigilant. His 
error in judgment reflects an 
inadequate understanding of the 
underlying principle of the sov-
ereignty of a United States naval 
vessel. Although his reprimand is 
not to be punitive, I concur that 
he can no longer serve effectively 
as Commanding Officer of the 
Vigilant and must he transferred 
to other duty.37 
The Commandant of the Coast Guard 
also noted in his action on the 
investigation of this case: 
Although nol mentioned III the 
opinions or recommendations, 
hindsight indicates that more 
aggressive actions on the part of 
Coast Guard Headquarters might 
have altered the prosecution of 
this inciden t. Specifically, Coast 
Guard Headquarters might well 
have insisted on more definite 
guidance from State Depart-
ment.38 
The Secretary of Transportation, 
John A. Volpe, reviewed this matter and 
stated: 
I do not concur in the award of 
court-martial in the case of Rear 
Admiral William B. Ellis, USCG, 
and Captain Fletcher W. Brown, 
Jr., USCG. It is my considered 
view that no purpose would be 
served by subjecting either RADM 
Ellis or Captain Brown to a 
court-martial. There is no doubt 
that both of these officers now 
appreciate fully their serious error 
of judgment in this case. It is also 
clear that they have been sub-
jected to most extreme castigation 
from many quarters in this nation. 
This, indeed, is a severe indict-
ment for which both they and 
their families have already suf-
fered. 
For these reasons, you are di-
rected to withdraw court-martial 
charges of any sort against RADM 
Ellis and Captain Brown. How-
ever, I do fully concur in the 
issuance of Punitive Letters of 
Reprimand to both officers. In 
taking this action, I have taken 
note of the fact that both officers 
are submitting requests for im-
mediate retirement and that these 
requests will be accepted. 
I approve of your action in the 
case of Commander Halph W. 
Eustis, USCG.39 
Some Precedent, Current Policy, and 
Law Regarding Asylum. On 5 June 
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1894 the Cqmmanding Officer of the 
U.S.S. Bennington permitted 17 persons 
who sought asylum as political refugees 
to board his ship while lying in the port 
of La Libertad in EI Salvador. When the 
Commanding Officer was initially re-
quested to grant the refugees asylum, he 
refused to do so. He later granted them 
asylum after he was assured that they 
would be summarily shot if they were 
caught by the forces of the revolution 
which had just seized control and 
proclaimed a provisional government of 
EI Salvador. It was his expectation that 
the asylum on board the Bennington 
would last only a few days until the 
refugees could be transferred to a 
steamer bound for Panama. On the day 
the steamer arrived in port, however, 
the consul of the United States at EI 
Salvador and two commissioners from 
the provisional government boarded the 
Bennington, and thc latter requestcd the 
surrender of the refugees as common 
criminals. The Commanding Officer of 
the Bennington refused to surrender the 
refugees without orders from the 
Seert'tary of the Navy. Th(' conllni~­
si()ll('r~ thcll appealed to him not to 
transfer the refugees to the steamer but 
to hold them until extradition could be 
demanded of the United States through 
proper chmlllds. The COlllnHullling 
Officer acceded to this request, subj('ct 
to fu ture instructions of the Secretary 
of the Navy. The conduct of the 
Commanding Officer of the Bennington 
on this occasion was characterized as 
eminently judicious and proper.40 
President Cleveland is quoted, with 
reference to the Salvadorean refugees 
case, as stating: 
The Government of Salvador 
having been over thrown by an 
abrupt popular outbreak, certain 
of its military and civil offj\'er~, 
while hotly pursued by infuriated 
insurgents, sought refuge 011 hoard 
the United States war ship Ben-
ni1lgton, then lying in a Salva-
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dorean port. Although the prac-
tice of asylum is not favored by 
this Government, yet in view of 
the imminent peril which threat-
ened the fugitives, and solely from 
considerations of humanity, they 
were afforded shelter by our naval 
commander, and when afterwards 
demanded under our treaty of 
extradition with Salvador for trial 
on charges of murder, arson, and 
robbery, I directed that such of 
them as had not voluntarily left 
the ship be conveyed to one of 
our nearest ports where a hearing 
could be had before a judicial 
officer in compliance with the 
terms of the treaty. On their 
arrival at San Francisco such a 
procceding was promptly insti-
tutcd before the United States 
district judge, who held that the 
acts constituting the alleged of-
fenses were political, and dis-
charged all the accused except one 
Cienfuegos, who was held for an 
attempt to murder. Thereupon I 
was constrained to direct his 
release, for the reason that an 
attempt to murder was not one of 
the crimes charged against him 
and upon which his surrender to 
the Salvadorean authorities had 
been demanded.4 1 
One of the results of the Salvadorean 
refugees case was that the Secretary of 
the Navy issued a regulation substan-
tially as it appears today in Navy 
Regulations:42 
0621. Granting of Asylum. 
The right of asylum for politi-
calor other refugees has no 
foundation in international law. 
In countries, however, where 
frequen t insurrrl:t ions occur, and 
constant instability of government 
exists, usage sanctions the grant-
ing of asylum; but even in waters 
of such countries, officers should 
refuse all applications for asylum 
except when required by the 
interests of humanity in extreme 
or exceptional cases, such as the 
pursuit of a refugee by a mob. 
Officers shall neither directly nor 
iTlllirect!(; invite refugees to accept 
asylum. 3 
On 23 November 1970, thc date of the 
attempted defection by Kudirka, there 
was no similar Coast Guard regulation in 
fore!! concerning asylum. 
Suhsequent to the issual1l:e of the 
foregoing Navy Regulation before the 
turn of this century, other obligations 
to grant asylum have been assumed by 
tlll~ United States. The plaque inside: the 
pcdestal of the Statue of Liberty 
reflects U.S. policy and includes the 
following: 
Giv~ me your tired, your poor, 
Your huddled masses yearning 
to breathe free, 
The wretched refuse of your 
teeming shores, 
Send these, the homeless, 
tempest-tossed to me: 
[ lift my lamp beside the 
golden door!44 
On II J)(:ecmher 1%2 Mn;. Franklin 1>. 
Roosevelt, U.S. delegate to the Seventh 
Regular Session of the General As-
sembly of the United Nations, stated 
that the United States " ••• would never 
force a refugee to return to his country 
of origin against his will.,>4 5 The U.S. 
Representative to the United Nations, 
Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, made the 
following statement on 20 April 1961 in 
the Political and Security Committee of 
the General Assembly of the United 
Nations: 
So long as A JI\('riCalUl n'lIlain a 
frce people, just so long will they 
uphold the right of asylum as a 
fundamental human right. This 
will not change. Nor, 1 profoundly 
believe, will the pressure to be 
frce stop. I do not deny that since 
the war thc arca of tyranny has 
widcned in somc parts of the 
world. In thesc areas people 
cannot protest their position pub-
licly or make clear their profound 
desire for Iiberty_ But it remains a 
fact that thousands upon thou-
sands have registered their protest 
in the only way o~en to them. 
Thcy have cseaped.4 
Article 14 of thc Univcrslll ))cclllration 
of Human Rights, adopted by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations 
at its Third Session, staLes that every 
person has a right to seek and to enjoy 
in other countries asylum from persecu-
tion.47 A statement on U.S. refugee 
policy was made by Mr. Robert 
McCloskey, Department of State press 
spokesman, on 1 December 1970, as 
follows: 
There has been no change in 
American policy regarding thc 
admission of rcfugccs into tlw 
United States. Sincc the cnd of 
World War II well ovcr one million 
refugees from countries around 
the world have, within the scope 
of our laws, been admittcd to thc 
United States for permanent resi-
dence. That, in our judgment, is 
an impressive record. And I just 
wanted to make it clear that thcre 
has been no change in that 
poliey.48 
In addition to the above indications 
of an open arms policy for political 
asylum seekers, the United States is a 
signatory to the Protocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugees to which the 
Senate advised and consented on 4 
October 19GB, the Presidcnt approv('d 
on 15 October 196B, lIIul which h(~canw 
effective on I Novcmber 196B.49 
Article 33 of thc Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees, which is 
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applicable to the United States through 
the Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, provides in paragraph I as 
follows: 
Prohibition of Expulsion or Re-
turn 
1. No Contracting State shall 
expel or return ("refouler") a 
refugee in any manner whatsoever 
to the frontiers of territories 
wherc his life or freedom would 
be thrcatencd on account of his 
race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership of a particular social 
group or political opinion. 
Article lA (2) of the Convention, as 
modified by article 1, paragraph 2 of the 
Protocol, defines a refugee as a 
person who ..• owing to well 
founded fear of being persecuted 
for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside .the country of 
his nationality and is unablc or, 
owing to such fcar, is unwilling Lo 
avail himself of the protection of 
that country. 
Finally, article IF of the Convention 
sLlIL(~s tIt<: provisions of thc Convention 
shall not apply to any pcrson with 
rcspeet Lo whom there are serious 
reasons for considering that he has 
committcd a serious nonpolitical crime 
outside the country of refuge prior to 
admission to that country as a refugee. 
The Soviets have frequently cited the 
foregoing provision and at the same 
time have falsely alleged that the 
refugee had committed some non-
political crime as a stratagem to cause 
the country of refuge to refuse to grant 
asylum to escapees. Accordingly, any 
sllch cllIim by the Soviets musl be 
cxmnincd with cl1re. SUdll1ll eXlllninl1-
tion is a propcr function of the 
Dcpartment of StaLe as is indicated in 
the subsequent recommendations. 
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Resultant Effect of Incident on 
Certain Persons. It has been ascertained 
by the author that Rear Admiral Ellis 
and Captain Brown received letters of 
reprimand and retired from active 
service in the Coast Guard on 31 
January 1971 as contemplated by the 
Commandant of the Coast Guard. 
Commander Eustis received a non-
punitive reprimand and has been trans-
ferred to new duties ashore. One 
Congressman is reported to have stated 
with regard to Eustis, "1 don't think, 
the way the system works, his future in 
the Coast Guard is very rosy."5 0 
Kudirka is reported in good health, 
living in a new apartment in his home 
city of Klaipeda, Lithuania, and as yet 
has not been arrested by the Soviets for 
his attempted defection. The captain of 
the Sovietskaya Litva, Vladimir M. 
Popov, is reported to have been 
court-martialed and sent to a Sovict 
labor camp apparently for failing to 
prevent the attempted defection by 
Kudirka. The rcported status of Kudirka 
may be a surprise to many readers. The 
Soviets have in the past, however, staged 
news conferences to denounce the \V cst, 
using defectors who have rcturned or 
persons such as Kudirka whose attempt 
to defect was not successful. Some such 
persons have becn arrested, tried, and 
punished after they have been used in 
such propaganda efforts. This may be 
the reason for Kudirka's reported 
freedom and new apartment. His fate 
may be determined after a propaganda 
effort in which the Soviets now seek his 
cooperation.5 1 
It has also been ascertained that the 
Department of State has, subsequent to 
23 November 1970, issued to the Coast 
Guard, and all U.S. departments and 
agencies which have, prior to this 
incident, not been involvcd in refugee 
unt! defector affuirs, proc(!dures for 
handling n~(]lwsts for ~olitieul asylulIl 
from foreign nationals.s 
Recommendations. The issue of 
granting or dcnying political asylum 
involves the application of international 
and domestic laws and domestic policies 
to specific facts and circumstances in 
cach refugee's case. The decision to 
grant or deny asylum also involves 
political considerations and possibly 
foreign relations with other nations. 
Such matters are not normally under 
the cognizance of the Coast Guard, 
Navy, Army, Air Force, or the Marine 
Corps but arc properly matters adminis-
tered by thc Dcpartment of Statc. Thc 
ultimate decision to grant or deny 
political asylum to a refugcc is, 
therefore, a matter for the Department 
of State to handle. This is not to say, 
however, that every decision concerning 
a refugce secking asylum must bc made 
by the State Department. Thc com-
mander of any U.S. ship, camp, or 
aircraft who is confronted by a refugee 
who has presented himself on board 
such ship, camp, or aircraft and who has 
requested asylum, must make thc initial 
decision to grant or deny temporary 
asylum to the refugee. It is submitted 
that the above-m('ntioned Convention 
und Protocol urc implicit in requiring u 
reasonuble inquiry to be nUHlc to 
determinc whether the refugee or 
defector is entitled to refugee status 
under such Convention and Protocol. 
Accordingly, a commander may grant 
temporary asylum and retain the person 
in U.S. custody for a sufficient time to 
permit his status to be determined and 
the ultimate decision to be made on the 
issue of asylum. 
It is recommended that a U.S. 
commander who is confronll:d hy a 
person who seeks politicul asylum tuke 
action hy: 
1. Grunting such person tempo-
rary asylum and retaining him in 
U.S. custody; 
2. Ascertaining as many facts and 
circumstances conccrning the 
possible basis for the requested 
asylum and the bona fide nature 
thereof as may be expeditiously 
obtained; 
3. Immediately reporting all 
known and reported facts and 
circumstances concerning the mat-
ter to superior authority via the 
mosL expeditious means;53 and, 
4. Retaining the person in U.S. 
cuslody pending thc receipt of 
directives from competent su-
perior authority. 
Under no circumstances should the 
person seeking asylum be arbitrarily or 
summarily expelled from a U.S. ship, 
camp, or aircraft pending determination 
of his status. To the extent circum-
stances permit, persons seeking asylum 
should he afforded reasonable care and 
protection. 
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I L is further recommended that 
Article 0621, U.S. Navy Regulations, 
1948, be revised to rcflcet currcnt 
policy and procedures for granting 
asylum within the Navy and the Marine 
Corps. 
--
Thc spherc of the Navy is 
international solely. It is this 
which allies it so e10sely to that of 
the statesman. Aim to be. your-
selves statesmen as well as seamen. 
The biography and history of our 
profession will give you glorious 
names who have been both. I trust 
the future lIlay show many such 
among the sons of this College. 
Alfred T. Mahan: 
To Naval War College Class 
of 1909 
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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
Monday, 23 November 1970 
8:00 a.m. U.S. delegation boards Vigilant 
8:49 a.m.. Vigilant' underway 
10:30 a.m. Vigilant moored to Soviet ship 
11:00 a.m. First overture of defection noted 
12:43 p.m. Vigilant sends message to First Coast Guard District 
12:49 p.m. Message received 
I: ] 8 p.m. Captain Brown calls Rear Admiral Hammond 
1:20 p.m. Captain Brown calls Rear Admiral Ellis 
1:26 p.m. Vigilant message doubleheaded to Coast Guard Headquarters 
1:28 p.m. Vigilant message received at headquarters 
1 :30 p.m. First Coast Guard District sends message to Vigilant 
1:38 p.m. Vigilant 12:43 message sent to State Department 
2:00 p.m. Kudirka passes cigarettes and note· to Lieut('nant Lundberg 
2:23 p.m. Vigilant sends message to First CQast Guard District 
2: 30 p.m. Conference in Captain Brown's office 
2:45 p.m. Captain Dahlgren contacts Mr. Killham, State Department 
3: ] 5 p.m. Mr. Killham calls Captain Dahlgren 
3:36 p.m. Vigilant receives First Coast Guard District instructions 
3:30 p.m. Captain Brown calls Rear Admiral Ellis 
3:45 p.m. Captain Dahlgren calls Captain Brown 
4: 12 p.m. Captain Brown calls Rear Admiral Hammond 
4:20 p.m. Kudirka jumps aboard Vigilant 
4:30 p.m. Captain Dahlgren calls Mr. Killham 
4:.10 p.m. Captain Brown left office for home 
5: 15 p.m. Commander Eustis calif: Rear Admiral Ellis 
5:40 p.m. Vigilant calls Woods lIole 
5:44 p.m. Woods Hole calls RCC 
5:47 p.m. Lieutenant Ryan tries to call Captain Brown 
6:00 p.m. Captain Brown calls Lieutenant Ryan 
6: 15 p.m. Commander Eustis calls Captain Brown 
6:38 p.m. First Coast Guard District receives Vigilant's 2:23 message 
6:38 p.m. Captain Brown calls Rear Admiral Ellis 
6:45 p.m. Captain Brown calls Lieutenant Commander Pakos 
6:4B p.m. Captain Brown calls Hear Admiral Ellis 
6: 5·~ p.m. CommHlII!I'r Eu::t i" I'all" Captain Brown 
7:;W p.m. Captain Brown I'all" HI',lr Admiral Ellis 
8:00 p.m. Formal request for return of Kudirka 

















Commander Eustis calls Captain Brown 
Lieutenant Ryan calls Lieutenant (junior grade) Tritbough 
Lieutenant (junior grade) Tritbough calls Rear Admiral Hammond 
and other Coast Guard officers in Washington 
Lieutenant (junior grade) Tritbough calls Mr. McGuire, State 
Department 
Call placed to Soviet Embassy from Vigilant 
Commander Eustis calls Captain Brown 
Soviet crewmen board Vigilant 
Vigilant unmoors from Soviet ship 
Kudirka subdued by Soviet crewmen 
Mr. Mainland talks with Lieutenant (junior grade) Tritbough 
Lieutenant Commander Pakos calls Captain Brown 
Kudirka loaded in small boat 
Kudirka returned to Soviet ship 
Small boat returns to Vigilant 
Vigilant escorts Soviet vessel into international waters 
Tuesday, 24 November 1970 
:J: 30 a.m. Vigilant moors at New Bedford 
----\f!----
